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SOME ADVICE ON BICE, NORTH DAKOTA’S MARKETABLE-
PRODUCT DECISION 
JOHN BURRITT MCARTHUR* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2009, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Bice v. Petro-Hunt, 
L.L.C.,1 and in so doing took its position on a question that has bedeviled 
major oil and gas producing states: Does the lessee, the operating oil 
company, have a duty to bear the full cost of putting natural gas into a 
“marketable condition,” including the cost of removing water and 
impurities, of processing gas to separate liquids, and of moving the oil or 
gas to the mainline pipeline, as part of the implied duty to market?  Or, 
instead, do royalty owners have to bear a share of these costs?2  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court took the position favored by lessees, joining 
jurisdictions that let lessees reduce royalty payments by the cost of making 
oil and gas marketable.3 
The theme of this article is that the rejection of a marketable-product 
rule in Bice was based on understandable but nonetheless real and 
demonstrable mistakes.  The deductions at stake affect the welfare of 
royalty owners throughout the state as well as the balance of rights and 
benefits between lessors and lessees.  The marketable-product issue remains 
contested in many other states.  Indeed, it has split oilfield jurisdictions into 
two irreconcilable camps, for reasons not addressed in Bice.  Given the 
 
 * John Burritt McArthur is a trial lawyer and arbitrator based in Berkeley, California.  He is 
licensed in Texas, California, and Alaska and has offices in Berkeley and Houston.  He has 
handled energy and other commercial cases for thirty-two years and represented producers, 
royalty owners, and other oilfield parties.  He has served as an arbitrator and as an expert in many 
oil and gas cases, including as an expert for the class in various natural-gas royalty cases.  Mr. 
McArthur, who holds a Ph.D. from the University of California (Berkeley) as well as two master’s 
degrees, a J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law and a B.A. from Brown University, 
has published dozens of articles on legal and economic aspects of the oil and gas industry.  He 
recently published a book on implied covenants as mentioned in footnote 1.  
1.  2009 ND 124, 768 N.W.2d 496.  The background to the discussion of Bice and related 
themes in this article is Mr. McArthur’s recent publication.  See JOHN BURRITT MCARTHUR, OIL 
AND GAS IMPLIED COVENANTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEXT STEP IN EVOLUTION (Juris 
Publications 2014).  Mr. McArthur’s book discusses the two camps of marketable-product 
jurisdictions in more detail as well as other aspects of the duty to market and the other covenants: 
the duties to explore, to develop, to protect against drainage, to reasonably accommodate, and to 
act as a prudent operator. 
2.  Bice, ¶¶ 6-7, 8-10, 768 N.W.2d at 499-500 (describing issue in Bice). 
3.  Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
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issue’s importance, the North Dakota Supreme Court should be receptive, 
should an opportunity arise, to revisit its earlier decision. 
Lessees receive the lion’s share of the revenue under standard 
American oil and gas leases.  In return, they have to perform at their own 
cost the activity involved in securing production.  They have to explore, 
drill, develop, and market oil and gas and pay all or most of the costs 
associated with these activities.  This is why they receive their much larger 
share of revenues, traditionally a seven-eighths share but in some modern 
leases five-sixths or even a bit less.  In a majority of states, as well as on 
federal properties, the lessees’ responsibilities have been determined to 
include bearing the full cost of making oil, gas, and other mineral products 
“marketable.”  But, since Bice, this is not so in North Dakota. 
Not only do a majority of oil and gas states apply marketable-product 
rules, but a majority of oil and gas production in the United States occurs on 
land governed by a rule that makes the lessee bear marketability costs.  
These costs include making gas physically marketable and can include 
moving the gas to the location where it is sold.  States so holding are a 
numeric majority, even before one counts the federal government, which is 
by far the largest mineral landowner in the country.  If one counts by 
production, most production in the United States falls under a version of the 
marketable-product rule.  And, overall, the marketable-product decisions 
tend to be the more recent decisions.  Nonetheless, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court adopted the older rule, which, relying on statements in a 
handful of law review articles,4 it incorrectly called the majority rule.5  The 
court held that lessee Petro-Hunt could deduct the costs of removing 
hydrogen sulfide and other liquids from the gas stream and separating out 
the dry gas at a downstream plant.6 
The great majority of marketable-product cases concern natural gas 
because the preparation of gas for mainline transportation tends to involve 
more field services than are required for oil.  These services include not 
only treatment to remove impurities but also processing as part of preparing 
gas for market.  Moreover, oil royalty clauses, unlike gas clauses, tend to 
have a standard term requiring delivery “free of cost” into the purchaser’s 
pipeline.  Courts often use the oil clause one different from the standard 
natural gas clause to define the lessee’s duty to absorb the costs of making 
oil marketable.  The issues in this article are primarily significant to the 
natural gas side of the industry. 
 
4.  Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01. 
5.  Id. ¶ 13, 21, 768 N.W.2d at 500-02. 
6.  Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
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I. BICE V. PETRO-HUNT: THE COURT’S POSITION 
Bice was a class action that arose in the Little Knife Field, which 
produces casinghead gas7 laden with hydrogen sulfide in addition to oil.8 
The trial court found that the gas had “no discernible market value at the 
well”9 because it had not been processed at that point.  The class plaintiffs 
sued to prevent the deduction from their royalty payments of the cost of 
extracting the sulfur and separating liquids from the dry gas.10  The opinion 
described the accounting for gas and gas products sold away from the well 
and deduction costs incurred to get the gas to market after it emerged from 
the ground at the wellhead by the common industry names that apply when 
deductions are allowed: the “work-back” or “netback” method.11  The 
plaintiffs’ various royalty clauses, though not all identical, were 
 
7.  Casinghead gas is gas “produced with oil in oil wells, the gas being taken from the well 
through the casinghead at the top of the well . . . .”  8 HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS, 
OIL AND GAS LAW 132 (Patrick Martin & Bruce Kramer rev. 2006).  
8.  Bice, ¶ 2, 768 N.W.2d at 498. 
9.  Id. ¶ 6, 768 N.W.2d at 499.  Extraction of the hydrogen sulfide turned “sour gas into 
sweet gas.”  Id. ¶ 8, 768 N.W.2d at 500. 
10.  Id. ¶ 5, 768 N.W.2d at 499.  The lessee added all revenue from selling gas and “gas 
products” and then deducted “certain costs associated with processing the gas.”  Id. ¶ 2, 768 
N.W.2d at 498-99. 
11.  Id. ¶ 14, 768 N.W.2d at 501. 
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substantially similar and provided for payment on “market value of the gas 
at the well.”12 
The class argued below that the trial court should adopt the “first 
marketable product rule” in order to require the lessee to bear the costs of 
producing marketable sweet gas.13  But the court rejected that request.  It 
decided instead to join the “at the well” jurisdictions in which the lessee has 
to bear the full cost burden of getting gas to the surface at the well but can 
share all costs after that point.14  Petro-Hunt received summary judgment 
approving its cost deductions and on the appropriateness, in the district 
court’s view, of the work-back method.15  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed in a quite brief decision for what appears to be three reasons. 
First, even though it described treatises as conflicted on the appropriate 
deduction standard, the North Dakota Supreme Court believed that the “at 
the well” doctrine was the majority position.16  Rather than citing treatises, 
it cited three law review articles, all critical of the marketable-product 
doctrine, as evidence of the majority rule.17  The decision does not suggest 
that the court performed an independent review of the caselaw before 
reaching this conclusion: it contains no substantive discussion of the 
individual cases making up what it took to be the majority and minority 
positions, even though the court does provide string cites to certain cases in 
each camp.18 
Second, the court cited one of the same law review articles to claim 
that “the” problem with the marketable-product position is a difficulty in 
knowing when a product “has become a marketable product.”19 
Third, the court found persuasive a 1995 Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision applying North Dakota law, Hurinenko v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc.,20 which, it believed, addressed the same situation as Bice and which 
took an “at the well” stance.  Although it did not discuss the federal court’s 
reasoning, the North Dakota Supreme Court apparently took from that 
decision that the term “at the well” is unambiguous and mandates use of a 
 
12.  Id. ¶ 4, 768 N.W.2d at 499. 
13.  Id. ¶ 10, 768 N.W.2d at 500. 
14.  Id. ¶ 21, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
15.  Id. ¶ 9, 768 N.W.2d at 500. 
16.  Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01. 
17.  Id. (citing Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product 
Doctrine: Just What is the Product?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 51 (2005); Edward B. Poitevent, II, 
Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 709, 716 (2003); Brian S. Wheeler, 
Deducting Post-Production Costs When Calculating Royalty: What Does The Lease Provide?, 8 
APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 7 (2008)). 
18.  Id. ¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d at 501. 
19.  Id. ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d at 502.  
20.  69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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work-back method when comparable sales are not available as an 
alternative source of value at the wellhead.21 
This article explores the court’s three reasons for the outcome in Bice. 
It finds each lacking and discusses the limits on Bice as far as different lease 
types as well as certain factors that the court may want to consider if—more 
likely, when—marketable-product issues return to it in the future. 
II. MISTAKES IN BICE 
The brief space that Bice devotes to analysis unfortunately prevented 
the North Dakota Supreme Court from really discussing the issues at stake 
and from developing a reasoned explanation for its holding.  This perhaps 
led to its error in identifying which position is the majority position on 
royalty deductions, to the court’s finding a “problem” in an unproblematic 
standard, and to its acceptance of Hurinenko’s overly simplistic position. 
A. THE COURT THOUGHT IT WAS ADOPTING THE MAJORITY RULE, 
BUT IT ADOPTED THE MINORITY RULE 
In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court mentioned at the outset of its 
analysis what it called the majority position: the “at the well” position, 
which is often associated with Texas and Louisiana law and one that almost 
always allows proportionate deductions for the costs of all services applied 
to oil and gas after the wellhead.22  It cited seven states—the “three major 
oil and gas producing states, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas,” as well as 
California, Kentucky, Montana, and New Mexico—as following this 
position.23  The court’s list was preceded by cites to three law review 
articles, all authored by critics of the marketable-product rule, that called 
the “at the well” position the majority position.24 
In contrast to the seven jurisdictions cited as favoring deductions for all 
services applied after the wellhead, the court cited only five jurisdictions as 
 
21.  Bice, ¶¶ 19-21, 768 N.W.2d at 502.  Each side claimed that the term “at the well” was 
unambiguous but unambiguous in its own favor: the plaintiffs argued that if the court did not find 
the term unambiguous in not authorizing deductions, then it was ambiguous.  Id. ¶ 12, 768 
N.W.2d at 500. 
22.  Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01. 
23.  Id. ¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d at 501. 
24.  Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01.  This one-sided citation to marketable-product critics 
only is a telling contrast with West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., a more balanced, earlier North Dakota 
Supreme Court decision in which the court held that a “proceeds” lease does not allow deductions.  
298 N.W.2d 484, 487 (N.D. 1980).  The West court cited three major treatises, two of which 
supported marketable-product rules and one that rejected such a rule.  Id. at 489 (citing 3 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS,  supra note 7, at 591-603; 3 EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS 319-
327 (1967); MAURICE MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 212-18 (2nd ed. 
1940)). 
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a “minority” that “have expressly rejected the ‘at the well’ rule and have 
adopted the first marketable product doctrine”: Arkansas, Colorado, 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and West Virginia.25  Because the court cited law 
review articles as authority for its classification of the majority and minority 
camps without providing its own analysis,26 it is fair to conclude that the 
court did not conduct independent analyses of these cases.  The court 
presumably assumed that the articles were correct in their tally of the 
majority rule.  Bice certainly spent no time on the reasons why oil patch 
courts are divided into two camps or in analyzing the cases that make up 
those camps. 
There are a number of problems with the court’s numerology, whatever 
its source.  First, its majority ranking ignores three states, Michigan, 
Nevada, and Wyoming, which have adopted marketable-product rules by 
statute.27  It is only fair to count these states because their statutes embody a 
rejection of the idea that a term like “at the well” is sufficiently clear to 
impose costs on the royalty interest and thus reduce royalty payments.  The 
inconsistency of these three statutes with the “at the well” doctrine is best 
illustrated by the Michigan statute, which was adopted in order to reverse 
what the Legislature clearly viewed as an erroneous state court endorsement 
of the lessee-favoring “at the well” position.28  The Michigan statute bans 
deduction of “postproduction costs” in leases entered after March 28, 2000, 
unless a lease explicitly provides for such deductions.29  In addition, the 
statute requires that many of the main costs be specifically identified before 
they can be deducted.30 
The Nevada statute makes the lessee “liable for all of the costs of 
production,” bars the lessor’s interest from being “decreased by the costs of 
production,” and defines such costs as including services frequently 
 
25.  Bice, ¶ 16, 768 N.W.2d at 501. 
26.  Id. ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d at 500-01 (citing articles in supra note 17). 
27.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.61503b(1) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.115 (2000); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304(iv) (1999).  One of the articles cited by the North Dakota Supreme Court 
does a good job of discussing the three statutes, correctly sees that these statutes have similar 
characteristics to the judicially derived law, and also discusses the federal rule.  See Keeling & 
Gillespie, supra note 17, at 51 n.194.  But the authors’ recognition of the importance of these 
statutes does not lead them to change their count; they still claim that “most states” follow an “at 
the well,” not marketable-product, approach.  See id. at 51. 
28.  The Michigan Legislature passed its statute after a Michigan court of appeals allowed all 
deductions under an “at the well” theory in a lease that provided for payment of “gross proceeds at 
the wellhead.”  Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 890-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).  
Schroeder left open whether Michigan would recognize an implied duty to market under other 
lease language.  Id. at 895-96.  In response, the Legislature passed the current statute on gas 
deductions.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.61503b(1) (1999).  
29.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.61503b(1) (1999). 
30.  Id. 
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provided away from the well such as “gathering, compressing . . . 
dehydrating, separating, and storing of oil or gas . . . and transporting . . . 
gas into the pipeline for delivery,” though not mainline transportation or gas 
processing.31  Thus, it defines costs that states like Texas call 
“postproduction” costs as “production” costs.  The Wyoming statute 
similarly provides that the “lessee pays all costs of production out of his 
interest, the lessor’s interest being free and clear of all those costs,” and 
contains a definition of the “costs of production” almost identical to 
Nevada’s statute.32 
Each statute precludes the kind of “at the well” reading lessees 
ordinarily claim.  It surely is necessary to count these states when trying to 
compute the majority rule between states that adopt the marketable-product 
rule and those that reject it.  If one does nothing more than include these 
three statutory states, jurisdictions favoring the marketable-product rule 
move into the majority by changing Bice’s ranking from seven to five in 
favor of the “at the well” rule, to eight to seven in favor of marketable- 
product jurisdictions.  The statutory rules do not govern leases entered 
before the statutes’ effective dates, but they do express what each state 
currently endorses as being the correct rule.  Therefore, these states should 
be in the marketable-product column. 
Second, Bice’s mathematics leaves out the country’s largest and most 
significant royalty owner of all, the federal government.  Federal royalties 
are based on leases that, in turn, use provisions prepared under the Secretary 
of the Interior’s discretionary power to implement the Mineral Leasing Act, 
which requires payment on the “amount or value” of production.33  Federal 
regulations implementing the Act require lessees to put oil and gas into 
marketable condition largely at their own expense in a provision that was 
upheld in the 1960s, although the regulations do allow certain processing 
deductions.34  This early interpretation of “value” required the lessee to bear 
 
31.  NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.115 (2000). 
32.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304(a) (1999).  
33.  30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) (2014) (stating, in general, on lands leased within known 
structure of producing field, royalty shall be paid “at a rate of not less than 12.5 percent in amount 
or value of the production removed or sold . . . .”). 
34.  With the Mineral Leasing Act requiring payment under most federal leases on the 
“amount or value” of production, standard federal leases allow the Secretary of the Interior to 
determine the “value of the production removed or sold from the lease.”  For a sample onshore 
federal lease, see BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFER TO LEASE AND 
LEASE FOR OIL AND GAS, FORM 3100-11 § 2 (2008) (“Lessor reserves . . . the right to establish 
reasonable minimum values on products after giving lessee notice and an opportunity to be 
heard”), http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/noc/business/eforms.Par.71287.File.dat/3100-
011.pdf.  For an offshore lease, see MINERALS MGMT. SERV., US. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OIL 
AND GAS LEASE OF SUBMERGED LANDS UNDER THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT, 
FORM MMS-2005 § 6(b) (2009) (“The value of production shall never be less than the fair market 
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marketability costs.  It shows that the marketable-product doctrine had a 
very influential application long before natural gas was deregulated. 
When one adds the federal government to the marketable-production 
jurisdictions, it certainly is true that the largest part of oil and gas 
production in the United States is governed by a marketable-product rule, to 
an even greater degree than the count of jurisdictions suggests.  The federal 
leases and regulations reject a reading that the “value of production” means 
value “at the well.”35  Moreover, when one does give weight to this federal 
standard, it is very conservative to count a landowner as large as the federal 
government as equal only to one state, when no state sources more than a 
fraction of the output from federal land.  In 2010, for instance, federal land 
(onshore and offshore) supplied thirty-four percent of the country’s oil and 
twenty-three percent of its natural gas.36  Production from federal land 
dwarfs production from land in any single state and even in any small group 
of states. 
 
value of the production. The value of production shall be the estimated reasonable value of the 
production as determined by the Lessor . . . .  Except when the Lessor [decides otherwise in 
certain conditions], the value of production . . . shall not be deemed to be less than the gross 
proceeds . . . .”).  The federal government’s reservation of the power to define “reasonable 
minimum values” is of long standing.  See Sarah L. Inderbitzin, This Little Company Went to 
Market: IPAA v. Dewitt and the Duty to Market Federal Oil and Gas Production at No Cost to the 
Lessor, 54 ADMIN.  L. REV. 1167, 1170-71 & n.15 (2002) (citing cases recognizing the power 
vested in the Secretary of the Interior to establish minimum values); see also Ross Malone, Oil 
and Gas Leases on United States Government Lands, 2 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 309, 340 
(1951).  The Interior Department’s authority to define “production” in “value of production” to 
mean “gas conditioned for market,” and therefore to make the lessee absorb compression and 
certain other costs, was upheld long ago in California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 385-88 (D.C. 
Cir. 1961).  Department regulations require the lessee to bear the costs of treating gas to put it into 
a marketable condition. 30 C.F.R. § 1205.152(i) (2010).  The rules were upheld against industry 
trade-group attack.  See Indep. Petrol. Ass’n of Am. v. DeWitt, 279 F.3d 1036, 1040-42 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (upholding regulations denying pass-through of downstream marketing costs, aggregation 
fees, and interhub transfer fees, though reversing Department on unused firm-demand charges by 
classifying them as transportation charges); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 
727-30 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding regulations that required producers to absorb cost of removing 
CO2 from coal-seam gas in order to make it marketable to pipelines), aff’d on other grounds sub 
nom. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006); Devon Energy Corp. v. Norton, No. 04-
CV-0821, 2007 WL 2422005 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Devon Energy Corp. v. 
Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030, 1032-41 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  The federal rule does allow some 
processing deductions. 30 C.F.R. §§ 1206.158-59 (2010). 
35.  A number of challengers to the federal rule have argued that their gas is marketable at 
the well.  See, e.g., Watson, 410 F.3d at 727-30.  This is the same factual argument that producers 
raise in most contemporary marketable-product cases.  However, the courts have upheld the 
Secretary’s discretion to reject that argument.  Id. at 730-31.  
36.  The 700,000 onshore mineral acres managed by the Bureau of Land Management are 
producing 11% of the country’s natural gas and 5% of its oil.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., Oil and Gas, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/ 
oilandgas html.  Offshore federal land in the Gulf of Mexico provides an additional 29% of the 
country’s oil and 12% of its natural gas.  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Gulf of Mexico Fact 
Sheet, http://www.eia.gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/.  
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The position of the federal government ensures that far more than half 
of the production in the country is subject to a marketable-product rule.  
The percentage of production that occurs under a marketable-product rule is 
even more one-sided because most producing states, including such core “at 
the well” states as Texas and Louisiana, use versions of marketable-product 
rules in their own leases.37  And some of these states own land responsible 
for very substantial production.  The land governed by marketable-product 
leases in these states pushes the share of national production subject to a 
marketable-product rule even higher. 
That even state agencies in “at the well” jurisdictions tend to use 
marketable-product clauses in their own leases is a compelling reminder 
that landowners with large enough interests to negotiate with lessees on an 
at least approximately equal basis are likely to expect some version of a 
marketable-product rule.  These leases suggest what the ordinary lease 
might look like if the average lessor had bargaining power comparable to 
the typical lessee’s powers. 
Even if one minimizes the federal rule’s impact by just counting it once 
and then includes the three statutory states, the tally becomes nine to seven 
in favor of the marketable-product rule, and this very lessor-favoring count 
does not recognize the disproportionate importance of federal production.  
If one were to adjust the count by volume weighting production, output 
from federal land is so large that the marketable-product share would rise 
further even though Texas, an “at the well” state, is the largest producing 
state. 
 
37.  For instance, of the two major landowning agencies of the State of Texas, the General 
Land Office and the University Land Office, both have leases that require, with some variation 
between the two lease forms, payment of gas royalties on the gross price for the former and the 
gross production for the latter, with some volume reduction possible for plant processing, but also 
a specific no-deduction clause that bars most ordinary field deductions.  See, e.g., TEX. GEN. 
LAND OFFICE RELINQUISHMENT ACT OIL & GAS LEASE FORM §§ 4(B)-(C), 7 (rev. Oct. 2001).  
This is in Texas, the leading “at the well” state.  For an example from another seemingly “at the 
well” state, see the California lease, which requires payment of gas royalties at the current market 
price, a price that is never to be less than the highest price in the nearest field for like gas.  In 
addition, the California lease has a separate, express, no-deduction paragraph. CAL. STATE LANDS 
COMM., STATE OIL AND GAS LEASE §§ 4(c), (f) (2004).   
 It is impossible to compute an exact production share of leases in which deductions can and 
cannot be taken because even in marketable-product jurisdictions, leases that expressly identify 
deductions will be enforced.  Conversely, even in “at the well” jurisdictions, some gross proceeds 
and market value leases without any geographic restriction and other leases that bar deductions 
will not allow deductions—at least, in all states but Texas, in which the supreme court has 
displayed a reluctance to protect even lessors who have the most clearly written no-deduction 
clauses.  No database cataloguing all of these terms in private leases exists.  Overall, though, a 
state’s position on the basic valuation issue discussed here is a good guide to the treatment of most 
production within its boundaries except on its public (state and federal) property.  Thus, it makes 
sense to roughly estimate the treatment of deductions on all land within a jurisdiction with the 
jurisdiction’s rule, as long as one acknowledges the often significant exception for public land.  
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Third, the New Mexico rule was not settled at the time Bice was 
decided, but the state certainly could not fairly be classified as an “at the 
well” state.  Class actions allowing marketable-product claims to proceed 
had been certified in three cases in which lessee appeals of certification had 
been consolidated, briefed, and argued to the New Mexico Supreme Court. 
The court decided the appeal barely two months after Bice.  The resulting 
Davis v. Devon decision38 properly led commentators to put the state into 
the marketable-product rule camp.39  Even had Bice only considered New 
 
38.  218 P.3d 75 (N.M. 2009).  The New Mexico Supreme Court had not rejected the 
marketable-product rule before Davis, but it had issued a difficult-to-apply but seemingly 
restrictive decision about implied covenants on a very odd set of facts in a dispute over a potash 
factory.  See Cont’l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 858 P.2d 66 (N.M. 1993).  Many 
lessees read this decision as making implied duties much less likely.  Later, a New Mexico court 
of appeals interpreted the term “net proceeds . . . at the well” in a way that many found similar to 
the Texas “at the well” approach.  Creson v. Amoco Prod. Co., 10 P.3d 853, 857-60 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2000) (citing Texas law favorably).  And the Tenth Circuit, although finding that the 
plaintiff’s failure to plead a contract violation prevented it from relying on implied covenants, 
nonetheless reached out in dictum to endorse Creson and stated the view that “at the well” would 
set the deduction boundary in New Mexico.  Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP Am. Prod Co., 407 
F.3d 1091, 1108-10 (10th Cir. 2005).  In addition, the Elliott court favorably cited a Fifth Circuit 
case which equated the terms “net proceeds” and “market value.”  Id. at 1110.  Yet New Mexico 
state courts had certified a number of deduction classes, leading to the appeal in Davis.  And when 
the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Davis on September 15, 2009, close on the heels of the 
July 9, 2009, Bice decision, it seemed to have moved New Mexico into the marketable-product 
camp.  The court did not rule on the marketable-product doctrine as such, but it let the cases 
proceed to trial on marketable-product theories, an outcome that made little sense unless the court 
envisioned some marketable-product rule applying to private leases in New Mexico.  
 In Davis, the court was faced with three natural gas implied covenant classes that had been 
certified on a “(B)(2)” same-treatment basis, but denied certification under the more frequent 
“(B)(3)” common question class.  Id. at 79.  The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the (B)(2) 
certification on grounds that Devon had “acted or refused to act or failed to perform” consistent 
with its legal duty to the class.  Id. at 81-82.  However, the court reversed the refusal to certify the 
common question class.  Id. at 83-86.  Had the court believed that under New Mexico law, 
standard lease terms do not have room for a marketable-product rule, or that New Mexico 
precedent barred such a theory in some way as the lessees argued, it surely would have affirmed 
the denial of certification in the three common question classes.  Instead, it cleared the way for all 
the cases to proceed to trial on that basis as well as on the (B)(2) claims.  
 It is true that the New Mexico Supreme Court did not rule on whether New Mexico 
ultimately will adopt a marketable-product rule.  Instead, it expressly reserved this question: 
“Thus, the question of whether and under what circumstances the marketable product rule applies 
in New Mexico is not ripe for review at this time.”  Id. at 80.  Yet its opinion contains an 
extensive discussion of the theoretical basis upon which New Mexico courts can find a 
marketable-product rule as a matter of law or of fact.  Id. at 83-86 (reversing denial of (B)(3) 
certification and holding that courts may imply covenant by “effectuating the parties’ intentions 
by interpreting the written terms of an agreement and analyzing the parties’ conduct, or they may 
be stating that a duty imposed by law creates an obligation on one or more of the parties to the 
agreement.”).  This discussion would have been irrelevant had the court thought that such a duty 
does not fit into New Mexico law.  Although the court still has not defined its precise marketable-
product rule, New Mexico has fallen into the marketable-product camp ever since Davis.  For a 
discussion of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s subsequent cases, including the special rule 
carved out for certain state lease forms, see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 264 n.156. 
39.  For a thoughtful analysis of New Mexico law on deductions and a prediction that its 
state courts will adopt a marketable-product rule, see Judge Browning’s decision in Anderson 
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Mexico as being in the marketable-product camp and ignored statutes and 
the federal government, its seven to five count in favor of “at the well” 
jurisdictions would have fallen to an even six to six. Adding the three 
statutory states, the count would have been nine to six in favor of the 
marketable-product rule; adding the federal government, too, as one would 
have to do if concerned about how most of the production in the United 
States is treated, the count would rise to ten to six in favor of the 
marketable-product rule. 
Fourth, the Bice count omits Alaska, which has been one of the largest 
oil producers in the United States since the late 1970s.  In Alaska, the vast 
majority of oil production is on state land.  The federal government has 
large onshore and offshore holdings, but most federal land has not been 
developed, in part for environmental reasons.  As a result, state leases 
presently determine the treatment of deductions on most Alaska production.  
And the first lease form used by the State has been interpreted to 
incorporate a marketable-product rule along federal lines, even though the 
State agreed in settlement with its major lessees to allow certain deductions 
under that lease form in return for an overall settlement.40  The second, the 
current Alaska “new form” lease, expressly bars most field deductions.41 
 
Living Trust v. ConocoPhillips Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 979, 1012-14, 1022-25, 1025 n.7 (D.N.M. 
2013); see also Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, No. IV 12-0040, 2015 WL 
1321479, at *105-09, *109 n.77 (D.N.M. Mar. 19, 2015) (including the many-page footnote 77 in 
a decision that explains why Judge Browning found himself compelled to follow a Tenth Circuit 
reading of New Mexico law that he does not believe is a correct estimate of state law).  
40.  After oil began flowing through the TransAlaska pipeline in 1976, the State of Alaska 
and the major producers on state land began to dispute the price on which the producers should 
pay royalties and what deductions they could take.  In the course of multi-year litigation, a judge 
ruling on summary judgment, after extensive discovery and briefing, rejected the lessee argument 
that “at the well” required field cost deductions under the standard Alaska lease form, the “DL-1” 
lease, and instead determined that the point of valuation was the downstream LACT measuring 
meter.  For the rationale, see Memorandum of Decision and Order, No. 1JU-77-84, slip op. at 12-
18 (Sup. Ct. Alaska Apr. 9, 1979) (Opinion of Compton, J.).  The judge concluded that the state 
lease had been modeled on the federal lease form. Id. at 21.  In a decision thirteen years later, 
another judge found “at the well” ambiguous and construed it against the oil companies. 
Memorandum Opinion Concerning the Applicability of ¶ 16 to Destination-Market Transactions, 
No. 1JU-77-847, slip op. at 12-17 (Sup. Ct. Alaska Mar. 25, 1992) (Opinion of Carpeneti, J.).  The 
court found that “literal interpretation” of “at the well” would “not be consonant with reason, or 
sound public policy.”  Id. at 17.  These disputes settled in lessee-specific Royalty Settlement 
Agreements, which do allow some deductions as part of the larger global settlement with each 
company, but, as shown above, the judicial interpretation of this first main state lease, the DL-1 
lease, was contrary to the “at the well” rule.  
41.  The newer Alaska lease form, the “new form lease,” bars at least most deductions.  It 
requires royalty payments “free and clear of all lease expenses,” including free of expenses 
incurred off the lease including but not limited to costs for such activities as “separating, cleaning, 
dehydration, gathering, saltwater disposal, and preparing the oil, gas, or associated substances for 
transportation off the leased area.”  STATE OF ALASKA, DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., COMPETITIVE 
OIL AND GAS LEASE, FORM NO. #DOG 200604 § 37 (2009), http://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/leasing/ 
Documents%5CBIF%5CNorthSlopeFoothills%5CAppendixCSampleLease.pdf.  
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Thus, at present, most production in Alaska is, or would be but for 
settlement, governed by terms that allow a marketable-product rule.  As a 
result, and because of the state’s unusual preponderance of production from 
public lands, Alaska is best classified in the marketable-product camp, even 
though the state’s courts have not adopted a general rule for private leases 
one way or the other.  The likely increasing role of federal production in 
Alaska, both onshore and perhaps someday offshore, will only expand the 
marketable-product rule’s sway in Alaska.  Adding Alaska would raise the 
marketable-product tally as of July 2009, the month Bice was decided, to 
ten to six when the three statutory states and the federal government are 
counted.  The count rises to eleven to six when one includes New Mexico, 
in which various deduction class actions had been moving to trial on 
marketable-product theories.42 
This does not exhaust the problems with Bice’s majority/minority 
count.  Another factor that should weigh in counting jurisdictions is that 
only state courts can decide state law with finality; federal courts cannot 
bind state courts on state law.  Making clear the limited federal powers in 
this area, the United States Supreme Court held, in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,43 that federal courts must defer to state courts on their own state 
law.44  Thus, while one can dispute how much discount should be applied to 
federal Erie guesses, federal court decisions on what state law means for 
marketable-product issues should receive less weight than state-court 
decisions on state law. 
Of the six state decisions that by July 2009 clearly favored a 
marketable-product rule (soon seven with the New Mexico Supreme 
Court’s September 2009 Davis decision), six—all but Alaska’s—are 
reasoned decisions not only by state courts, but by the highest state courts.  
Decisions of at least four of these courts—the supreme courts in Colorado, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia—are major articulations of the 
marketable-product rule.45  The federal precedent adopted by the Secretary 
 
42.  An Ohio court of appeals addressed that state’s deduction rule before Bice was decided, 
but did not decide the issue.  See Schmidt v. Tex. Meridian Res., Ltd., No. 94CA12, 1994 WL 
728059 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1994).  The court declined to take a position as a matter of law 
because the only cases cited on the appropriate standard came from other states and no Ohio court 
had issued a decision.  Id. at *3.  Ultimately, it decided the case for the royalty owners on grounds 
of “usage and custom,” based on the fact that the transportation fee had not been charged against 
the lessor’s interest in the first “twenty years or more” of production.  Id. at *6-7. 
43.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
44.  Deference to state courts extends to state intermediate courts, not just state supreme 
courts.  West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). 
45.  The Arkansas decision may be weaker than the other state decisions.  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court refused to allow compression cost deductions in a “proceeds received by Lessee at 
the well” lease, thus taking the marketable-product position on that term and not giving the term 
“at the well” the kind of weight it would get in, say, Texas, but it did not squarely address the 
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of the Interior and affirmed by federal courts is also in the direct line of 
authority for setting federal rules. 
In contrast, of the six state jurisdictions (six when New Mexico is 
removed from this camp) with “at the well” rules by late 2009, two of the 
rules, those in Mississippi and Kentucky, rested on federal decisions about 
state law, and so should have been at least somewhat discounted because 
they were not as authoritative as a state-court decision.46  Further, at least 
two of the state decisions counted in Bice as “at the well” decisions did not 
really decide that general issue.  Bice treats Montana Power Co. v. Kravik47 
as putting Montana in the “at the well” camp.48  Yet Montana Power was 
decided before natural gas was deregulated, before the gas sales market 
shifted so fundamentally to a downstream market, and before gas 
 
marketable-product doctrine.  Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563, 564-65 (Ark. 
1988).  A dissenting judge on the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the idea that the lessee bears all 
of what he called “post production” costs.  Id. at 566 (Hays, J., dissenting) (citing Clear Creek Oil 
& Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer, 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924)).  A federal judge subsequently refused to put 
Arkansas in the marketable-product camp in Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494, 503-05 
(E.D. Ark. 2009).  It certainly is true that none of these decisions addressed the point of valuation 
in the deregulated gas market, but the Hanna majority’s enforcing the “proceeds” portion of the 
royalty clause over the “at the well” term reflects a marketable-product orientation, not an “at the 
well” orientation.  
46.  The federal decision predicting Mississippi state law is the Fifth Circuit’s Piney Woods 
Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 230-38 (5th Cir. 1984).  The Mississippi 
Supreme Court cited the Fifth Circuit’s Piney Woods interpretation of Mississippi deduction law 
in Pursue Energy Corp. v. Abernathy, 77 So. 3d 1094, 1099 (Miss. 2011).  However, the Pursue 
case did not concern royalty owners challenging the lessee’s taking a deduction, but rather the 
allegedly excessive amount of processing charges that occurred after the plant had been paid off. 
Id. at 1098.  Ironically, the plant was the same plant whose costs had been challenged in Piney 
Woods. See id. at 1097.  The federal decision on Kentucky law is Poplar Creek Development Co. 
v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 240-44 (6th Cir. 2011).  While the first federal 
decision on state law has some value in predicting what the state rule ultimately will be, 
particularly if it is a well-reasoned decision, the marginal contribution of additional federal 
decisions is limited.  Federal decisions may influence, but do not have the authority to control, 
how a state court will decide the issue.  Kentucky law also includes three earlier state court of 
appeals decisions that interpreted “silent” leases to require settlement at the well: two cases were 
decided before not only gas deregulation but before gas regulation, with one decided in the very 
early days of implementing the United States Supreme Court’s 1954 determination that wellhead 
gas crossing state lines should be federally regulated.  Thus, all three are difficult to appraise in 
their application to the modern deregulated natural gas market.  See generally Reed v. Hackworth, 
287 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 88 S.W.2d 989, 991-92 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1935); Rains v. Ky. Oil Co., 255 S.W. 121 (Ky. Ct. App. 1923).  Recently, 
however, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that it does follow the “at the well” valuation 
method.  See Baker v. Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc., No. 2013-SC-000497-DG, 2015 WL 4967131 
at *5-6 (Ky. Aug. 20, 2015).  The Kentucky Supreme Court did hold, in a same day decision in 
Appalachian Land Co. v. EQT Production Co., 468 S.W.3d 841, 843-46 (Ky. 2015) that in the 
absence of contrary lease language, the producer alone is responsible for severance taxes, which 
Kentucky statutes define as a tax on the “privilege of engaging in” the business of producing oil 
by taking it from the earth. (emphasis omitted).  
47.  586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978). 
48.  See Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d 496, 501.  
           
558 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:545 
marketable-product disputes began in earnest.49  Furthermore, Montana 
Power was about a regulatory price issue, not a deduction issue.50 
The California authority cited in Bice is similarly less than a full loaf if 
cited as support for “at the well” rules because California courts have not 
directly addressed marketable-product arguments.  No California court has 
yet to decide a case in which a lessor argued for the marketable-product 
rule.  Almost all of the pertinent California decisions predate the rise of the 
marketable-product controversy, and most involve oil, not gas, and 
practices about the sale of oil in the early days of California’s field 
development.51  While California’s precedent is suggestive, and the 
suggestion does tilt the state toward the “at the well” camp, it is not clear 
where the California Supreme Court will end up on marketable-product 
issues. 
Although these factors suggest discounting the list of “at the well” 
states, there is one state that could be added to the tentative “at the well” 
count.  Bice overlooks Utah, a state in which a 1962 hard-mineral case 
suggests that it too may well fall into the “at the well” deduction camp.  The 
suggestion is muted, of course, because most of the marketable-product law 
 
49.  Montana Power, 586 P.2d at 300. 
50.  Montana Power concerned how a regulated price fits into determining the price 
appropriate to a “market value” royalty clause.  Id.  The court phrased the issue as “[o]f what 
relevance are FPC regulations governing the interstate sale of gas to the determination of the 
‘market price’ of gas sold only intrastate?”  Id.  The case had been decided below on the papers, 
having been submitted on pleadings, interrogatory answers, and stipulations. Id. at 299-300.  The 
decision gives no sign that either side raised deduction questions.  The court treated the price issue 
before it as “resolved” by a series of cases that also have nothing to do with deductions.  Id. at 
300-01 (citing decisions on relevance of cases over role of federal regulated price in determining 
market value and concluding, on issue that was in dispute, that the cited cases proved that federal 
regulated prices “are of no relevance in setting the amount of royalty to be paid under a market 
price lease”).   
 The Montana Supreme Court did round out its decision with an aside about a second-best 
way of measuring market value by deducting costs from a downstream price. Id. at 303.  But its 
expression on this uncontested issue not before the court should be viewed in the same way as the 
undisputed assumption that costs could be deducted at the well in the Kansas decision in Matzen v. 
Hugoton Production Co., where the plaintiffs did not dispute that valuation should be set at the 
well. 321 P.2d 576, 580 (Kan. 1958).  The Kansas Supreme Court later properly distinguished 
Matzen as “not applicable” to questions of where deductions should begin because the Matzen 
parties had stipulated to wellhead deductions, when that court issued its leading deduction 
decision in Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964).   
 The offhand dictum in Montana Power on an uncontested nonissue was hardly a decision 
rejecting the marketable-product rule, even though some courts and commentators have cited it as 
such.  Bice, of course, read Montana Power as putting Montana in the “at the well” camp.  Bice, 
¶ 15, 768 N.W.2d at 501.  Recent federal decisions make the same mistake.  See S Bar B Ranch v. 
Omimex Can., Ltd., 601 F. App’x 569, 569 (9th Cir. 2015); Emery Res. Holdings, LLC v. Coastal 
Plains Energy, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240 (D. Utah 2012).  For an example of this reading 
of Montana Power in one of the articles cited by Bice, see Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 17, at 
51 n.193. 
51.  For an analysis of the California rule, see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 270-74. 
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has developed after 1962, and the case is not about natural gas.  As a result, 
this early case should not fully dictate the Utah Supreme Court’s decision if 
a marketable-product case ever reaches it.52 
Under any reasonable combination of these cases, a full and proper 
count in 2009 would have grouped a majority of oil and gas jurisdictions in 
the marketable-product camp.  Thus, the majority-rule pillar of Bice should 
be pulled out, with the decision then left swaying on two faulty pillars to 
which this article soon will turn. 
The count has remained in favor of marketable-product jurisdictions.  
Since 2009, three courts, two state and one federal, have taken positions on 
the issue in states not counted in Bice.  Of these three, a federal court 
interpreting Virginia law predicted that Virginia would follow a 
marketable-product rule.53  The second decision is the North Dakota 
Supreme Court in Bice. 
Third is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Kilmer v. Elexco 
Services Inc.,54 a decision that has been cited as rejecting the marketable-
product doctrine but one that contains little of the reasoning that usually 
goes along with that position.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court formally 
held that a lease that expressly allows deductions (and would be read to do 
so in marketable-product or “at the well” jurisdictions) is not invalidated by 
Pennsylvania’s unique Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (“GMRA”).55  
 
52.  The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in a relatively early uranium cost-deduction case 
suggests that Utah also will take a position allowing deductions if the issue is presented to it in an 
oil-and-gas setting.  See Rimledge Uranium and Mining Corp. v. Fed. Res. Corp., 374 P.2d 20, 23 
(Utah 1962).  The lease required payment on “gross proceeds” including any bonuses or premiums 
the lessees received, but not any “transportation and development allowances paid or granted to 
the lessees.”  Id. at 20.  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments based on the plain meaning of 
terms like “gross proceeds,” provided no discussion in text of the industry meaning of this term, 
cited only cases that allowed deductions, and held that none of the terms “market value,” 
“proceeds,” or “gross proceeds” prevent a lessee from deducting costs.  Id. at 22-23.  Whatever 
the court would have thought had someone presented a marketable-condition argument, and 
whatever the lease language about not having to pay royalties on transportation and development 
“allowances” meant, Rimledge is out of step with other decisions in its interpretation that the term 
“gross proceeds” is consistent with a net proceeds standard, not a gross standard.  Id. at 22.  A 
federal district court in Utah relied on Rimledge in predicting that Utah will join the “at the well” 
jurisdictions, although unfortunately it, like the North Dakota Supreme Court in Bice and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1157 (Pa. 
2010), relied on the erroneous assumption that this is the majority deduction rule.  Emery Res. 
Holdings, Ltd. v. Coastal Plains Energy, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1241-42 (D. Utah 2012).  
53.  A federal magistrate predicted that Virginia will adopt the first marketable-condition 
rule. Legard v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00041, 2011 WL 86598, at *9-13 (W.D. Va. Jan. 11, 
2011); see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 265 n.156. 
54.  990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010). 
55.  Id. at 1156-58. For the express deduction language and statutory floor language, see id. 
at 1150.  Kilmer has been cited by a number of Pennsylvania courts and Third Circuit courts, but 
only one other state court.  Most of these subsequent decisions apply Kilmer to the Pennsylvania 
royalty statute and hold that per Kilmer a lease providing for net-back or work-back computations 
does not violate Pennsylvania’s Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act.  See, e.g., Carey v. New Penn 
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The Kilmer decision erroneously assumes that the plain meaning of the term 
“royalty” incorporates an “at the well” valuation point and, like Bice, 
assumes that this is the majority position.56  Also, the Pennsylvania decision 
is unfortunately similar to Bice in giving no detailed consideration to the 
reasons for either the “at the well” or marketable-product positions.  In 
addition, its pronouncement on deductions was unnecessary for two 
reasons.  First, the court found that the disputed statute is silent on the 
deduction issue,57 a finding that should have made it unnecessary for the 
court to say anything more about Pennsylvania’s ultimate deduction rule. 
Second, the lease in dispute would be treated as authorizing deductions 
even in marketable-product states, so the rule the court adopted should not 
have affected the outcome of the case.58  In this setting, the court is likely to 
face requests that it reconsider the state’s standard on a fuller record than 
has been before it thus far.59 
 
Explor., LLC, No. 3:09–CV–188, 2010 WL 1754440 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2010).  But Kilmer itself 
did not address the circumstances when particular lease language might or might not allow 
deductions.  Under the logic in Kilmer, at least in general, it is surely now correct that deductions 
authorized by the lease should not be counted in determining the Pennsylvania Act’s one-eighth 
floor, even when the specific deductions and lease language are different from the Kilmer lease.  
See Ulmer v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 4:08–cv–2062, 2011 WL 1344596, at *3. (M.D. 
Pa. Apr. 8, 2011).  On the other hand, it should be too broad a reading to conclude, as some courts 
have, that Kilmer endorses the net-back method under all leases no matter what their phrasing, 
because Kilmer only dealt with a lease that authorized deductions. For an example of this broad 
reading, see Pollock v. Energy Corp. of Am., No. 10–1553, 2011 WL 3667289, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 
June 27, 2011).  The author is addressing the Pennsylvania rule in a forthcoming article, 
Pennsylvania, Kilmer, Marketable Products, and Natural Gas Deductions: Revisiting the 
Unnecessary Issues (forthcoming 2016). 
56.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the “majority rule” on deductions by stating 
“[t]he Gas Companies reject the relevance of the fact that a minority of jurisdictions have adopted 
the First Marketable Product Doctrine.”  Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1155 (emphasis added).  The court 
thus incorporated the companies’ incorrect counting of marketable-product jurisdictions.  As the 
prior text in this article shows, a larger number of jurisdictions had followed versions of a 
marketable-product rule by 2010, some by judicial decision, some by statute, and the largest one 
of all, the federal government, by administrative interpretation.  
57.  Id. at 1157. 
58.  Even in the most ardent marketable-product jurisdictions, a lease that stated, as did the 
Kilmers’ lease, that royalties were to be paid on a one-eighth royalty “less this same percentage 
share of all Post Production Costs,” and that then included a specific definition of those costs as 
including “without limitation, all gathering, dehydration, compression, treatment, processing, 
marketing and transportation costs incurred in connection with the sale of such production,” id. at 
1150, would be enforceable.  
59.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was only ruling on whether the statutory language, 
which puts a floor under the royalty share, limits deductions if they push the royalty share below 
one-eighth of the revenue stream.  See id. at 1153.  On that issue, the court held that the state’s 
Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act does not intend to limit deductions, and instead that its one-
eighth floor on royalties only applies to the share of the revenue stream at the wellhead.  Id. at 
1156-58.  In effect, the court interpreted the Act as putting a floor under the base price used in 
royalty computations but not on deductions that might lower the final payment.  Id.  The court 
could have walled off this conclusion as a mere statutory interpretation without deciding whether 
it would adopt a marketable-product rule.  Indeed, even the lessee Gas Companies contended that 
Kilmer was not the case for the court to decide whether the state will adopt a marketable-product 
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Regardless of how one analyzes Kilmer, these additional cases do not 
overturn the net counting in favor of the marketable-product rule in 2009.  
Bice was in error over which rule was the majority rule and which the 
minority rule in 2009, and it would be in error on the same point if issued 
today.  If a majority/minority count should have played any role in Bice, it 
should have tilted the court toward adopting a marketable-product rule, not 
away from it. 
The point is not that the court should have determined the majority rule 
and applied it because it is the majority rule.  Such a counting exercise, in 
essence a blind following of the weight of precedent across all producing 
states to have addressed the issue, is the antithesis of the kind of reasoned 
decision we rightly expect from our courts.  There are significant 
differences in some of the marketable-product rules, particularly the 
allowance of certain deductions under the federal and some state rules, such 
as shown by a recent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court treating what 
appears to be largely a service arrangement as an at the well “sale” that 
generates “proceeds.”60  The count may keep changing at the margins for 
 
rule because that doctrine arose in “common law in interpreting ambiguities in leases, not through 
statutory interpretation of a preexisting statute.”  Id. at 1155.  When the Kilmer court phrased the 
issue to be decided, it was not whether to adopt a marketable-product rule or not, but whether the 
statute prevents use of the net-back method that the lease so clearly mandated: “whether the 
GMRA precludes parties from contracting to use the net-back method to determine the royalties 
payable under an oil or natural gas lease.”  Id. at 1151.  The trial court, which granted summary 
judgment for the Gas Companies, had similarly phrased the question as whether the net-back 
method—the lease’s express provision for deductions on sales away from the well—“violated the 
GMRA,” and “ultimately held that the lease did not violate the GMRA because ‘[t]he statute in 
question does not prohibit the inclusion of “post-production” costs to calculate the one-eight 
royalty. . . .’”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed, 
could easily have limited its reasoning to that dispositive point.  And, indeed, when the court 
summarized its holding it said nothing about the marketable-product rule as such.  Instead, it, too, 
discussed the issue only in terms of whether the minimum royalty statute prohibited the 
deductions authorized by the lease, not in terms of any marketable-product issues: “[W]e hold that 
the GMRA should be read to permit the calculation of royalties at the wellhead, as provided by the 
net-back method in the Lease . . . .” Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).   
 Kilmer is broader than necessary, however, because the court’s route in reaching its 
conclusion was not the direct path from its threshold conclusion that the Legislature intended 
“both parties’” positions due to the GMRA’s silence on the deduction issues, but instead involved 
a deviation into a twisting, roundabout analysis that includes a digression about the term 
“royalty,” in reality a broad and general category rather than a specific lease term, having an 
industry-specific “at the well” meaning, id. at 1157; for criticism of Kilmer, see generally 
McArthur, supra note 55.  
60.  In Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., the Kansas Supreme Court held that in applying 
Kansas’s marketable-product rule, a field contract with a service company that takes gas at the 
well and provides ordinary marketability services but pays for the gas using a downstream price 
reduced by the cost of field services, establishes the “proceeds” relevant to royalty payment at the 
well. 352 P.3d 1032, 1035-36, 42 (Kan. 2015).  For an analysis and critique, see John Burritt 
McArthur, Mineral Royalties, Deductions, and Fawcett v. OPIK: Continuity and Change in the 
Revised-But-Still-Standing Kansas Marketable-Product Rule, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 63 (2015).  
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some time to come,61 but the basic division between jurisdictions is likely to 
remain. 
As a reflection of the raw political power of the relatively more 
concentrated lessee interests and the money at stake, the count in favor of 
marketable-product rules may be diluted legislatively.62  But given the size 
of federal production, most production in the United States is likely to 
continue to fall under versions of marketable-product rules for a very long 
time even if the state lineup changes.  The Bice court’s erroneous 
assumption that the “at the well” position is the majority rule is likely to 
remain erroneous.  This mistaken assumption may be the reason that the 
court did not conduct a real analysis of the merits on the two sides of this 
disputed industry issue.  Bice’s brevity and failure to perform that analysis 
is unfortunate because the parties affected by North Dakota’s gas deduction 
rule deserved a fully reasoned decision on the merits. 
The counting error in Bice also is unfortunate because Bice, in turn, 
like the handful of law review articles mistaking the majority rule, has been 
cited as evidence that the majority of oil-and-gas jurisdictions reject the 
marketable-product rule.63  Such replications are a reminder of the way that 
precedent can magnify the impact of statements of error, letting false 
counting snowball and distort the path of the law, just as precedential 
networks can beneficially circulate and expand thoughtful, insightful, and 
correct decisions.  Left untended, Bice may continue to be a self-fulfilling 
false prophecy and encourage other courts to adopt “at the well” standards 
as if they were the majority standard, when they actually reflect the 
minority viewpoint. 
 
61.  For instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently decided a deduction case, see supra 
note 46, which firmed up its ranking as an “at the well” state. 
62.  Deduction rules are vulnerable to political change in either direction. The Michigan 
Legislature passed a statute rejecting a judicially created “at the well” rule.  See discussion supra 
note 28.  But in states where producers have more power than Michigan, obviously the political 
pendulum may swing further in the lessee direction.  Cf, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 902(1) (2012) 
(Oklahoma’s recent statute seeking generally to bar fiduciary claims against those operating wells 
and performing “any duties owed to any person under a private agreement, statute, governmental 
order or common law relating to the exploration for, operations for, producing of, or marketing oil 
or gas, or disbursing proceeds of production of oil or gas . . . .”). 
63.  In S Bar B Ranch v. Omimex Canada, Ltd., a federal court claimed that Montana is in 
the majority “at the well” camp in part by citing Bice for its error on which deduction doctrine is 
the majority rule and in part by citing Bice’s error in reading this position into a prior Montana 
Supreme Court case. 942 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (D. Mont. 2013), aff’d, 601 F. App’x 569 (9th 
Cir. 2015).  A federal judge in Utah also included Bice in its incorrect counting of the respective 
jurisdictions.  See Emery Res. Holdings, LLC v. Coastal Plains Energy, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1231, 1239-40 (D. Utah. 2012).  
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B. BICE PROFESSED TO SEE A “PROBLEM” WITH AN ISSUE THAT IS 
NO PROBLEM 
The Bice court culled its second reason for rejecting a marketable-
product rule from an offhand comment in one of the three law review 
articles it cited.  It claimed that “[t]he problem with the first marketable 
product doctrine” is incoherence: “the difficulty in determining when the 
gas has become a marketable product.”64  The court never demonstrates the 
difficulty it feared.  Bice did not contain an analysis or discussion of what 
“marketable” means, a sifting of any evidence about the gas market, a 
thoughtful discussion of the various potential marketable-product standards, 
or a showing of specific difficulties in defining marketability.  As its 
evidence that marketable-product states “have failed to articulate a clear 
standard for determining when a marketable product has been created,” the 
court just cited to a two-paragraph section in one article that also did not 
demonstrate why marketability is difficult to prove.65 
 
64.  Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 17, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502. 
65.  Id. (quoting Wheeler, supra note 17, at 24).  Wheeler lists “that it can be difficult to 
determine when the gas becomes ‘marketable’” as “[o]ne of the major criticisms” of the 
marketable-product rule. Wheeler, supra note 17, at 10.  But other than explaining that Colorado 
has treated this issue as a question of fact and citing without explanation one other law review 
article, he offers no discussion of why this would be such an unusual factual problem for courts or 
juries.  This is very thin soil on which to plant any part of Bice.   
 The Wheeler article repeats this point later in the article as the author claims in discussing 
Colorado law that “it is impossible to establish an exact formula for determining when gas 
becomes marketable . . . .”  Id. at 20.  This is either not true—the Colorado formula yields a quite 
precise standard on which the jury can be instructed— or meaningless, if it intends to mean that 
any factual standard for marketability is too indeterminate.  And, of course, a court always could 
define a standard based on functional categories were definiteness the only important requirement 
for a fair rule.  
 The Wheeler article has other weaknesses.  First, it repeats the generic argument that lessees 
had to use a vague term like “at the well” because it was “difficult to determine exactly which 
post-production costs may arise” during a lease.  Id. at 4.  Yet it was foreseeable, even by the early 
1920s, that such services as compression, dehydration, gathering, and some separation might be 
needed.  There is no reason a lessee had to avoid listing at least the foreseeable services that would 
be deducted if they applied, perhaps with a catch-all “and any other similar costs.”  Second, 
Wheeler denies that making a lessor’s interest bear service costs is an imposition of “cost 
sharing.”  Id. at 5.  This semantic sleight-of-hand is wrong because the undeniable economic 
effect of such a rule is that a lessor does share costs that it otherwise would not bear.  Wheeler 
may just mean in this point that the lessor does not pay these costs literally out of pocket; the 
charges come from reductions in the royalty stream.  Nonetheless, they are just as real as any 
economic costs.  Third, Wheeler claims that the marketable-product rule “does not extend beyond 
the boundaries of the lease.”  Id. at 9.  Not only is this not true, but the jurisdiction that authored 
the first leading state marketable-product decision, Kansas, made it clear that this would be a 
misreading of its law back in 1964.  See, e.g., Schupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1, 5 (Kan. 
1964).  Fourth, Wheeler cites Michigan as an “at the well” jurisdiction even though the Michigan 
Legislature rejected this judicially adopted standard by adopting a marketable-product rule by 
statute in 1999. See discussion supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.  Fifth, in discussing the 
specifics of individual marketable-product jurisdictions, Wheeler omits the leading Colorado case, 
Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1999), two key Oklahoma decisions, TXO 
Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994) and 
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There is no special problem in defining marketability.  Like all fact 
issues, the term can be subject to conflicting proof.  But marketability 
remains a typical fact issue. 
Initially, it appeared that the major marketable-product jurisdictions 
would identify specific functions—compression, gathering, dehydration, 
treatment, processing, transportation—and classify them as per se 
deductible or not deductible.66  Such an approach, of course, would not 
have presented any difficulty in determining marketability, perhaps except 
for a gray area in which parties might dispute when gathering turns into 
transportation.  But per se categories drew criticism from lessees for a 
different problem, namely, that a categorical approach was insufficiently 
flexible.  In hopes that they could win at trial what they were not winning 
by category, lessees sought the very less certain system that Bice used to 
condemn the marketable-product rule. 
Marketable-product standards have moved away from purely 
categorical standards, a change that has increased their flexibility but to 
some extent reduced the definitiveness of the standard.  Ironically, given 
that Bice used a purported problem of indefiniteness as a reason to avoid 
marketable-product standards, it has been lessees, not lessors, who 
generally have resisted fixed categories in marketable-product jurisdictions.  
In these states, lessees prefer fact variable tests because the more factual the 
standard, the more room they have to argue that gas is marketable “at the 
well” as long as any sales, even to third parties, occur in the vicinity of the 
wells in issue.  Thus, it is an irony to see a commentator or the North 
Dakota Supreme Court using a factual flexibility that lessees in marketable-
product jurisdictions have championed as a reason to refuse to adopt the 
rule. 
 
Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Okla. 1998), and the most important 
Kansas decision, Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).  Sixth, there are other 
marketable-product jurisdictions (as this article has shown), and federal properties with their rule.  
Seventh, Wheeler lists as a criticism of the “at the well” approach that it, like the marketable-
product approach, “can often be unpredictable and difficult to administer . . . .”  Wheeler, supra 
note 17, at 24.  Yet nothing makes this an insoluble fact issue.  Such problems should raise doubt 
about articles like this as support for the court’s ruling.  
66.  For the claim that in the 1990s Kansas and Oklahoma were classifying cost deductibility 
categorically by function as a matter of law, see Owen Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should 
Royalty Obligations Be Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part II, 37 NAT. 
RESOURCES. J. 611, 664-65 (1997); see also Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 905 
n.21 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (citing Kansas and Oklahoma as jurisdictions that “have seemingly 
held that certain costs are not deductible as a matter of law.”).  As the text accompanying notes 
71-85 indicates, marketability is a fact issue in at least most marketable-product jurisdictions.  In 
general, deductibility turns upon whether services are going to produce a marketable-product or 
are applied after one already has been created. 
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In addition, marketability is not as amorphous as the article cited in 
Bice makes it sound.  The legal concept of “a market” connotes active 
buyers and sellers.67  It has been applied in many areas, including in 
hundreds of oil and gas cases about market value and antitrust cases that 
turn on market definition.  The factual standard has led courts to reject as 
qualifying markets such nonmarket transactions as affiliate sales,68 isolated 
transactions,69 and transactions that are disguised service agreements with 
the true base price set at downstream locations.70  As far as definiteness, the 
standards currently articulated by the four leading marketable-product 
jurisdictions are described in the following pages. 
 
67.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396, 398 (Okla. 1970) (“Market rate implies the 
existence of a free and open market of supply and demand where there are willing sellers and 
buyers.”).  In Parry v. Amoco Production Co., Judge Dickinson cited Black’s Law Dictionary’s 
definition of a market as a “[p]lace of commercial activity in which goods, commodities, 
securities, services, etc., are bought and sold.”  No. 94CV105, 2003 WL 23306663, at *11 (D. 
Colo. 2003) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 970 (6th ed. 1990)). 
68.  See, e.g., Tara Petrol. Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Okla. 1981) (“Whenever a 
lessee or assignee is paying royalty on one price, but on resale a related entity is obtaining a higher 
price, the lessors are entitled to their royalty share of the higher price.”); Howell v. Texaco, 112 
P.3d 1154, 1160 (Okla. 2004) (holding royalty owners are owed the higher market value and that 
“an intra-company gas sale cannot be the basis for calculating royalty payments”). 
69.  Parry, 2003 WL 23306663, at *13-20 (providing a thorough discussion of various small 
sales, as well as sales that defendant Amoco’s counsel had arranged to give the appearance of a 
local market, in a detailed decision issued after a bench trial).  The idea that it is not sensible to 
treat small, local sales as the benchmark for value of large downstream sales has a long pedigree.  
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Watson, 410 F.3d 722, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds sub 
nom. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006); Cal. Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 384, 387-88 
(D.C. Cir. 1961) (distinguishing “marketing” from “merely selling”).  The distinction between just 
any sale and one that complies with the duty to market presumably was the logic of the jury in 
Rogers v. Westerman, which decided that gas sold at the well was marketable there, but gas not 
sold there was not.  29 P.3d 887, 894 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).  Judge McAnany, a Kansas state 
court of appeals judge, correctly pointed out that given that “there is some point on every such 
[demand] curve where somebody would be willing to pay for the item,” the idea of marketability 
itself becomes “superfluous” if all it requires is any sale no matter what kind of sale.  Fawcett v. 
Oil Producers, Inc., 306 P.3d 318, 327 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (McAnany, J., concurring).  But the 
Kansas Supreme Court, though mentioning Judge McAnany’s point, rejected it as it reversed the 
lower court.  Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., 352 P.3d 1032, 1042 (Kan. 2015). 
70.  The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished the base gross proceeds from the net sales 
price after the cost of field services had been deducted under a field-service-and-sales agreement 
and required royalty payment on the gross price when interpreting a “proceeds” lease.  Hockett v. 
Trees Oil Co., 251 P.3d 65, 72 (Kan. 2011).  It did not stay faithful to that principle, though, when 
this past summer it accepted a net price, not the gross price, as proper for royalty payment when a 
lessee entered service-and-sales contracts tied to the wellhead with various mid-stream companies. 
Fawcett, 352 P.3d at 1041-42; for discussion, see generally McArthur, supra note 60.  The 
argument that lessees should be able to pay royalty on a lower price if the buyer provides 
marketing services and deducts the costs from the sales price also appeared in a case recently 
before the Oklahoma Supreme Court.  Pummill v. Hancock Exploration LLC, 341 P.3d 69 (Okla. 
2014); for this argument, see Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2, 9-10, Pummill, Cause No. 111,096 
(Okla. July 16, 2014).  But the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the three partial summary 
judgments at stake in Pummill for more factual development without addressing the merits of this, 
or any other, issue.  Pummill, 341 P.3d at 69. 
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In Kansas, the lessee “has the duty to produce a marketable product, 
and the lessee alone bears the expense in making the product marketable.”71  
Unless the lease expressly provides for deductions, the “nonworking 
interest owner is not obligated to bear any share of production expense, 
such as compressing, transporting, and processing, undertaken to transform 
gas into a marketable product.”72  Costs to “enhance” an already marketable 
product, unlike marketability costs, may be passed on as long as they are 
reasonable.73  Exceptions to this implied duty have to be stated expressly.74 
The impact of the Kansas rule has been somewhat limited because the 
Kansas Supreme Court has now held that a lessee who hires a service 
company to transform its gas after the well and sell it downstream, even 
when that “purchaser” only receives a charge reflecting its services, can 
treat the net price the company pays after deducting the costs of its services 
as “proceeds” for royalty purposes.75  It remains to be seen how service 
agreements dressed in the garb of sales arrangements will fare under the 
good faith and implied duty standards, which, as the court reminded 
readers, the lessee’s sales must satisfy before they can set the price for 
royalty payment computations.76  But, in any event, the court did not alter 
the basic requirement that the lessee must produce a marketable product at 
its own expense. 
In Colorado, the lessee must put gas “in the physical condition where it 
is acceptable to be bought and sold in a commercial marketplace” and move 
it to “a location, the commercial marketplace, where the gas is 
commercially saleable.”77  Costs after that point to “enhance” already 
marketable gas are deductible.78  In other words, the lessee must pay to put 
 
71.  Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 799 (Kan. 1995). 
72.  Id. at 800. 
73.  Id. (citing Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 866 P.2d 652, 661 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)). 
74.  Farrar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 234 P.3d 19, 28-31 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (providing a 
discussion of substantive Kansas law).  The opinion includes the conclusion that “[u]nder Kansas 
law, an implied covenant can only be defeated by express language showing a contrary intent.”  
Id. at 29. 
75.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
76.  Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., 352 P.3d 1032, 1042 (Kan. 2015). 
77.  Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 905-06 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).  Rogers 
was applied in Savage v. Williams Production RMT Co., in which the court of appeals upheld the 
trial court’s finding that gas “was not marketable at the wellhead because it had to be processed 
and transported to the pipeline . . . .”  140 P.3d 67, 71 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).  In Clough v. 
Williams Production RMT Co., the court of appeals affirmed judgment based on a jury’s rejection 
of the producer’s argument that the gas was marketable at the well.  179 P.3d 32, 34-35 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2007).  The court of appeals also upheld the trial court’s discretionary exclusion of market 
evidence about the pre-1992 regulated gas market as too remote to claims about the 1996 to 2004 
deregulated gas market.  Id. at 37-38.  
78.  Garman v. Conoco Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 655 (Colo. 1994) (en banc)) (“Garmans concede 
that costs incurred after the gas is made marketable, which actually enhance the value of the gas, 
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the gas in a marketable condition and location.  This standard is likely to 
result in holdings like that of a Colorado state court judge in 2003 after a 
bench trial: he found the Colorado San Juan Basin gas at issue was 
“marketable, both as to physical condition and location, only after 
gathering, compression and treatment and delivery to the inlet for the 
interstate pipeline.”79 
In Oklahoma, “post-production” costs, by which the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court appears to mean off-the-lease costs, are not deductible if 
they are “necessary to make a product marketable, or . . . within the custom 
and usage of the lessee’s duty to create a marketable product . . . .”80  The 
court found it “common knowledge” that field processes needed to make 
gas marketable include, “but are not limited to, separation, dehydration, 
compression, and treatment to remove impurities.”81  In contrast, costs that 
merely enhance an already marketable product can be deducted.82  If an 
Oklahoma lessee wants to take deductions, it must show that the lease 
expressly lets it do so.83 
Finally, in West Virginia, unless a proceeds lease very clearly says 
otherwise, the lessee has to bear “all costs incurred in exploring for, 
producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale.”84 
For any lease to allow deductions, it must “provide that the lessor shall bear 
some part of the costs . . . identify with particularity the specific deductions 
the lessee intends to take . . . and indicate the method of calculating the 
amount . . . .”85 
None of these standards should pose unusually difficult problems for 
factfinders.  The facts may be complex, but not more complex than the facts 
in many disputes over economic issues.  Even though resting on fact issues, 
the marketability standards often will lead to the same gas valuation point, 
the market area between the processing plant and mainline pipeline, and 
thus provide substantial certainty even if not that of a fixed categorical rule.  
 
should be borne proportionately by all parties benefitted by the operations.”).  The court further 
explained that “after a marketable product has been obtained, then further costs in improving or 
transporting such product should be shared by the lessor and lessee.”  Id. at 661 n.27 (citing 3 
KUNTZ, supra note 24, § 40.5). 
79.  Parry v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 94CV105, 2003 WL 23306663, at *19 (D. Colo. Oct. 6, 
2003).  See also discussion supra note 69.  
80.  Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Okla. 1998). 
81.  Id. at 1208.  
82.  Id. at 1205.  As a result, “in some cases a royalty interest may be burdened with post-
production costs, and in other cases it may not.”  Id. 
83.  See Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 883 (Okla. 1992) (“If a lessee wants 
royalty owners to share in compression costs, that can be spelled-out in the oil and gas lease.”). 
84.  Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va. 2001). 
85.  Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 30 (W. Va. 2006). 
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These standards will become, and should become, more definite when 
linked to the duty to market’s core value: the lessee’s responsibility to get 
the best price reasonably possible.86 
Even if the standards continue to be articulated as they are today 
without a formal link to the best price reasonably possible, they present the 
kind of factual issue that juries and courts resolve all the time.  Today these 
standards usually will result in a requirement that lessees produce mainline 
pipeline-ready gas.  As the Colorado Supreme Court has stated, “it may be, 
for all intents and purposes, that gas has reached the first-marketable 
product status when it is in the physical condition and location to enter the 
pipeline.”87  This is the same conclusion that the Colorado trial judge cited 
above reached for San Juan Basin natural gas.88  In a recent, extraordinarily 
detailed 284-page decision, federal Judge Browning in Albuquerque 
determined that the gas at issue before him only came into “marketable 
condition when it is of sufficient quality to be accepted into the interstate 
pipeline system,”89 although he decided not to certify a class for other 
reasons. 
C. THE COURT DEFERRED TOO MUCH TO A FLAWED FEDERAL 
DECISION 
The third and last reason Bice stated for rejecting a marketable-product 
rule is a federal decision making an “Erie guess” about North Dakota law.  
The decision, Hurinenko v. Chevron,90 involved a “similar royalty dispute” 
to Bice.  In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court found Hurinenko 
“persuasive.”91  Yet Hurinenko is not persuasive. 
Like Bice itself, but even more so, Hurinenko provides very little 
reasoning or explanation for adopting a firm position on an issue as 
disputed as the marketable-product issue.  It is just eight paragraphs long. 
The first paragraph summarizes the case status and outcome; the last, just 
six words long, merely states that the court affirms.  So there are only six 
short paragraphs of merits discussion.  Overall, the entire discussion 
consumes less than a page.  A fully reasoned explanation sometimes can, it 
is true, come in a small package.  But that is not the case in Hurinenko. 
 
86.  See, e.g., MCARTHUR, supra note 1, at 252-54, 262-63, 377-78.  
87.  Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 905 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (emphasis 
added). 
88.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
89.  Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., L.L.C., No. CIV 12–0040 JB/LFG, 2015 
WL 1321479, at *6 (D.N.M. March 19, 2015). 
90.  69 F.3d 283 (8th Cir. 1995). 
91.  Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 20, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502. 
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The dispute again was over casinghead gas, which could not be shipped 
or sold until contaminants were removed.92  The applicable lease language 
required royalties paid on “market value at the well.”93  After the North 
Dakota Industrial Commission stopped oil production because the oil 
companies were flaring associated natural gas produced with the oil, the 
companies built a processing plant to capture and market the gas.94  They 
deducted proportionate processing costs from royalty payments.  The 
Hurinenkos, a large family group, accepted deductions for fifteen years.  In 
1993, however, they sued to challenge the deductions.95 
At the outset, one can note that this was a vulnerable position.  The 
Hurinenkos’ delay exposed them to a sometimes unspoken but vintage 
oilfield principle that parties who sit on their hands for long periods of time 
tend to lose, whether on affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel or 
because courts are reluctant to reward them and likely to find some other 
way to rule against them on the merits.96 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the companies.97  The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed by holding that North Dakota already had set a 
“well-recognized,” “established meaning” for the term “market value at the 
well.”98  In its view, that meaning is that such value is fixed by “the ‘work-
back’ method: deducting processing costs from gross sales revenue.”99  This 
conclusion would surprise many readers of North Dakota law, and the court 
cited only two North Dakota Supreme Court decisions, Amerada Hess 
Corp. v. Conrad100 and Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson,101 as sources of the 
supposedly “well-recognized,” “established” meaning.  The reason for 
surprise is that neither case is on point. 
Neither Conrad nor Hanson concerned deductions.  Instead, both cases 
addressed the discretion extended to the Tax Commissioner to seek out 
appropriate value under North Dakota’s severance tax statute; in Conrad, 
discretion over the Commissioner’s adopting a “workback method”102 (with 
no one arguing over deductions) and in Hanson, discretion over oil volume 
 
92.  Hurinenko, 69 F.3d at 284. 
93.  Id. at 285. 
94.  Id. at 284-85. 
95.  Id.  
96.  For cases on the reluctance to reward perceived delay in the oilfield investment context 
generally, see John Burritt McArthur, The Restatement (First) of the Oilfield Operator’s Fiduciary 
Duty, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587, 691-93 (2005).  
97.  Hurinenko, 69 F.3d at 284. 
98.  Id. at 285. 
99.  Id. 
100.  410 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1987). 
101.  536 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 1995). 
102.  Conrad, 410 N.W.2d at 127. 
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measurements.103  Bice correctly noted that the North Dakota Supreme 
Court had not previously addressed (before Bice) what “market value at the 
well” means for royalty purposes.104  Thus, the court at least implicitly 
confirmed that Hurinenko was in error to assume that the North Dakota 
Supreme Court had decided the meaning of “at the well” in these two tax 
cases or anywhere else. 
A deeper look at the two cases shows how far they are from precedent 
on deductions.  In Conrad, the North Dakota production-tax statute at issue 
provided for tax payments on “gross value at the well,” which the court 
defined as “fair market value at the time of production.”105  The issue is a 
familiar one to oil-and-gas lawyers: when the governing royalty (or tax) 
standard is “market value,” do the operating company’s sales prices prove 
market value so that the proceeds it generates are synonymous with market 
value, or must “market value” be computed from “outside” prices external 
to the particular lessee and being paid generally in the vicinity of the 
disputed property?106 
Amerada Hess was selling gas through a thirty-four year old agreement 
in which it received only half of the net income its buyer, Signal Oil and 
Gas Company, received when reselling the gas.107  In turn, Signal built and 
operated a processing plant.108  Thus, Amerada Hess essentially traded half 
of the revenue stream in return for Signal’s performing the field services 
that many courts define as marketability services. 
The Commissioner, unhappy with this low revenue stream as the basis 
for tax payments, argued that he had discretion to use prices outside 
Amerada’s actual sales contract and picked downstream prices, from which 
he deducted downstream expenses in a typical “work-back” computation, to 
determine the basis for tax computations.109  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court, which had approved the Commissioner’s 
decision.110 
 
103.  Hanson, 536 N.W.2d at 708. 
104.  Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 18, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502. 
105.  Conrad, 410 N.W.2d at 127.  
106.  The Texas Supreme Court authored the leading decision standing for the separation of 
proceeds and market value measures of value in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 
871 (Tex. 1968).  The supreme courts of Oklahoma, in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 
1269, 1272-74 (Okla. 1981), and Louisiana, in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp, 418 So. 2d 
1334, 1337-41 (La. 1982), produced the leading decisions maintaining the unity of the two 
measures of value.  
107.  Conrad, 410 N.W.2d at 127. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
110.  For the trial court’s rulings, see id. at 127. 
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A striking feature of Conrad is that the court treated it as entirely a 
question of deference and statutory construction, not a contractual issue of 
lease interpretation (tax statutes do not involve lease issues) or a matter to 
which implied duties might apply.  The statutory scheme showed that taxes 
were to be levied on “fair market value,” the tax applied whether sales 
occurred or not, and the statute specifically authorized the Commissioner to 
use the “prevailing price then being paid,” not just “proceeds of sale” or the 
equivalent for gas of “like kind, quality, and character.”111  The court also 
cited what it called the majority oil-and-gas rule that “market value” is 
distinct from the lessee’s sales price.112  The decision did not turn on either 
deductions or the phrase “at the well.” 
Koch Oil v. Hanson was no more relevant to Hurinenko and Bice than 
Conrad.  Hanson resolved a dispute over whether the Commissioner could 
reject Koch’s hand-measured oil volume readings at the well and instead 
determine the volume upon which taxes had to be paid using Koch’s 
mechanical downstream volume measurements, which tended to show a 
higher volume of oil.113  Ordinarily, one would expect downstream 
measurements to be somewhat lower than wellhead measurements because 
there would be small amounts of leakage.  Thus, the higher downstream 
volume measurements suggested that the wellhead volumes were too low.  
The court, finding that the “oil extraction tax is of a complex and technical 
nature,” deferred to the agency and found that the Commissioner “could 
reasonably conclude that meter gauging [performed downstream] is more 
accurate than hand gauging [performed at the well].”114  Using the meter 
gauge readings was a reasonable way of determining “fair value.”115 
The court also rejected Koch’s optimistic but somewhat blind (after 
Conrad) argument that because it sold its gas in arm’s-length sales, the 
Commissioner was bound to accept the value generated in those sales as the 
basis for tax computations.116  This argument fell before a dismissive cite to 
Conrad and its broadly deferential view of the Commissioner’s power to 
determine “fair market value,”117 which rejected just this kind of position. 
If it had any relevance, Koch would stand for a principle that the 
Commissioner is not bound by “at the well” volumes and, more generally, 
 
111.  Id. at 129 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-51-05 (1987)). 
112.  Id. at 129-30. 
113.  Koch Oil Co. v. Hanson, 536 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 1995) (downstream monthly 
measurements audited showed “volume gains” over wellhead measurements in forty-six of forty-
eight months audited, with a total gain over period of 137,822 barrels).  
114.  Id. at 706-07. 
115.  Id. at 707-08.  
116.  Id. at 707. 
117.  Id. 
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that fundamental values should not be distorted by that geographic 
reference.  Koch argued that “it is impossible to determine values at the 
well when using downstream measurements . . . .”118  The court rejected 
this version of an “at the well” argument.  But Koch, like Conrad, was not 
about deductions, leases, or implied duties, and unlike Conrad, it was not 
even a case about economic valuation as such.  It was about volume 
measurement, not what price or costs apply once one has determined 
volumes.119  It would be hard to think of two oil or gas cases less relevant to 
Hurinenko and Bice than Conrad and Hanson.  Unfortunately, the sum total 
of Hurinenko’s reasoning about the “well-recognized,” “established” 
meaning of “at the well” comes from these two cases that do not define or 
apply “at the well.”  These cases provide no support for the North Dakota 
Supreme Court in Bice. 
III. RELATED ISSUES TO CONSIDER WHEN DEDUCTIONS COME 
AROUND AGAIN 
One of the strong beliefs of common law courts is that facts matter.  As 
a result, it is better to advance the law in short, concrete steps rather than by 
a leap of rational projection.  If the North Dakota Supreme Court does again 
face the marketable-product issue, it will be in a better position to articulate 
a proper rule—one way or the other—when it has a record before it.  The 
record should contain evidence about what “at the well” means, how the 
field was developed, where gas is sold today compared to in the earlier 
regulated market, whether the field was developed primarily to serve distant 
demand or local demand, and whether prices that purportedly reflect local 
“markets” are true economic prices at all.  Beyond this, a few words can be 
said about the marketable-product issues generally. 
The court certainly will face arguments that the plain meanings of “at 
the well” and perhaps “production” mean value set at the well,120 versus 
 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. at 707-08 (“The Commissioner’s use of downstream metered measurements of the 
volume of oil . . . has nothing to do with valuation of the barrels of oil to be taxed.”). 
120.   See Bruce Kramer, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation by Looking at the Express 
Language: What a Novel Idea?, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 223, 253 (2004) (“‘At the well’ therefore 
describes not only location but quality as well. Market value at the well means market value 
before processing and transportation, and gas is sold at the well if the price paid is consideration 
for the gas as produced but not for processing and transportation.”) (internal quotation marks in 
original); Scott Lansdown, The Marketable Condition Rule, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 667, 671 (2003) 
(“Historically, there was a clear recognition that, under most oil and gas leases, the point of 
valuation for royalty purposes was at the well.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); David Pierce, 
The Renaissance of Law in the Law of Oil and Gas: The Contract Dimension, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 
909, 935-36 (2004) (“If the lease provides for a gas royalty based upon ‘market value at the well,’ 
the issue will be what was the market value of the gas, at the well.”); cf. generally John Lowe, 
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arguments that these terms are silent or at least ambiguous on deductions121 
and, in contrast, purpose arguments that the court should be guided by the 
overriding purpose of the lessee’s duty to provide a marketable product.  
This is the fundamental divide between the two groups of cases.  The legal 
meaning of “at the well” is dependent upon which camp a state joins.  In 
marketable-product jurisdictions, “at the well” is not specific enough to 
authorize deductions; in “at the well” jurisdictions, the term is, as the label 
suggests, treated as sufficient.  Thus, there is circularity in finding “at the 
well” sufficient to justify an approach before the court addresses which 
approach makes sense to it.  The North Dakota Supreme Court, though 
siding with an “at the well” approach, provided no discussion of why it did 
so in terms of the fundamental underlying division.  Nor did Hurinenko. 
Marketable-product jurisdictions reject the argument that saying “at the 
well” is enough to signal an intent to take deductions for services rendered 
from the wellhead on.  It is notable that, for language allegedly intended to 
authorize deductions, the wording “at the well” says nothing at all to show 
that it is intended to regulate cost deductions, much less anything about 
which costs.  For that reason, the Colorado Supreme Court has found the 
term silent on deductions122 and certainly not providing clear or adequate 
notification of any cost treatment, whatever the reason the term was used.  
And, even if one finds the non-cost language ambiguous, as did the West 
Virginia Supreme Court,123 ambiguous leases are interpreted against the 
lessee, the party in charge and traditionally the drafter, pursuant to the 
vintage rule of the American oil patch and one that the North Dakota 
Supreme Court enforced in West v. Alpar Resources, Inc.124  It is the failure 
 
Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 244-66 (1996) (discussing “plain terms” 
jurisdictions and “cooperative venture” jurisdictions). 
121.  All of the major marketable-product jurisdictions have rejected the idea that “at the 
well” is specific enough to authorize deductions by its own terms.  For the Colorado ruling, see 
infra text accompanying note 122; for the West Virginia ruling, see infra text accompanying note 
123.  The author has discussed the Kansas rule in McArthur, supra note 60. For the Oklahoma 
rule, see Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Okla. 1998) (the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court articulating that state’s rule in a manner inconsistent with “at the well” doctrines).  
122.  Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 897-901 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). 
123.  Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 28-29 (W. Va. 2006).   
124.  For West’s rule of construction, see infra text and accompanying notes 145-48.  In West 
v. Alpar Resources, Inc., Alpar Resources showed the kind of language a party would use—
although it used the wrong agreement to do so, with most courts rejecting efforts to modify leases 
through division orders—if it wanted to authorize deductions when it cited a division order sent by 
the lessee to the Wests with language specifically allowing deductions.  298 N.W.2d 484, 486 
(N.D. 1980).  The Wests refused to sign the form.  Id.  The proposed but unsigned division order 
provided for royalty on “net proceeds” and defined that term to mean actual proceeds minus 
“dehydration, gathering, compressing, treating and any other actual costs and expenses required to 
make the gas marketable and transport same to the point or points of delivery to the purchaser.”  
Id.  
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of such terms to say what lessees later allege they mean that led to the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s famous (or infamous) observation that lessees 
used “at the well” deliberately in order to “avoid directly stating their 
objectives in sharing costs”125 and the West Virginia Supreme Court to 
accuse lessee producers of using the concept of “post-production” costs as a 
code to escape their responsibility to bear production costs.126 
The court will face the question of how a changed marketplace affects 
lease language that was adopted when a marketable product so commonly 
was sold at the well.  Natural gas deregulation upended the market in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, as intended, and the major buyer/seller 
transactions moved downstream of processing plants.  The function of 
providing a product, which is marketable in the primary market sought by 
most producers, was once fulfilled at the well, but today is fulfilled by 
downstream sales after processing plants. 
It may be a factor in gauging the significance of this transformation 
that most after-well field services, like processing, could be applied at the 
well, but not economically.  Many of the functions performed to put gas 
into marketable, pipeline-ready form theoretically could be handled at the 
well.127  But to do so often would be grossly inefficient.  Lessees, of course, 
 
 Courts generally find division orders insufficient to modify the lease because the purpose of 
division orders is not amending the lease but establishing ownership shares for royalty payment 
purposes.  See generally John Burritt McArthur, The Mutual Benefit Implied Covenant for Oil and 
Gas Royalty Owners, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 795, 803-10 (2001).  In North Dakota, the 
Legislature has prohibited lessees from using division orders to water down substantive royalty 
payment terms.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.3 (2014) (“A division order may not alter or amend 
the terms of the oil and gas lease.  A division order that varies the terms of the oil and gas lease is 
invalid to the extent of the variance and the terms of the oil and gas lease take precedence.”).  In 
contrast to the language in the division order proposed to the Wests, which was invalid because it 
was the wrong agreement to try to amend a lease (not because the language was vague or 
ambiguous), “at the well” does not tell an average reader that it is intended to address a cost issue 
at all. 
125.  Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 899 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). 
126.  Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 264 (W. Va. 2001) (“To escape the rule 
that the lessee must pay the costs of discovery and production, these expenses have been referred 
to as ‘post-production expenses.’”).  Even Owen Anderson, though he ultimately came out in 
favor of allowing deductions for services provided after the well, nonetheless concluded similarly 
after a careful analysis of the background to marketable-product issues.  He found that courts that 
rely on such terms as “market value at the well” and “proceeds” as controlling are taking select 
terms in what generally are form contracts out of the context and ignoring other lease terms, 
including the term “production” and the fact that a finished product is a requirement for “market 
value” or “proceeds” sales. Anderson, supra note 66, at 637-38 (“‘[P]roceeds’ and ‘amount 
realized’ . . . suggest an actual sale . . . .  [F]or there to be a real market price or market value, 
there must be a market, a marketable product, a ready and willing seller, and a ready and willing 
buyer.”).  
127. Some processing can be provided at or near the well, in which case it is called “field 
processing.”  See Processing Natural Gas, NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, 
http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing-ng/ (last visited, July 9, 2015).  The Kansas Supreme 
Court discussed the lessee’s discretionary power to select the location for providing gas 
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should minimize costs, and thus maximize profits, wherever they legally 
can.  But taking steps to gain economies of scale for their own savings 
should not make formerly nondeductible costs suddenly deductible. 
In making any decision, the court should be cognizant that the 
argument in Bice that field costs can be deducted because there is no market 
at the well,128 thus allowing deduction on the theory that the costs are 
incurred to increase value, produces the opposite conclusion on the same 
facts in marketable-product states.  That there is no market at the well 
suggests, as does logic, that the gas is not yet marketable.  The issue is, after 
all, whether the lessee is obligated to produce a marketable product, a 
product once often found at the well but today most often downstream.  
Marketable-product jurisdictions hold that if it is the lessee’s duty to 
produce a marketable product, it has to produce one that can be sold, and 
this condition cannot be met at the well if there is no market at the well.129  
A related question for the court will be whether marketability is satisfied by 
the “first” marketable product, or the product instead has to be marketable 
at a price acceptable under the duty to market, that is, the best price 
reasonably possible, as this author has urged.130 
The court almost certainly will face briefing that touts local sales near 
at least some wells as proof that natural gas generally is marketable “at the 
well” all over North Dakota.  Yet local sales often have problems of thin 
markets, comparability, and best-price issues, and they certainly do not 
reflect the market for which most of the country’s major gas fields were 
developed and in which prudent lessees try to sell their gas.  The gas 
infrastructure of major gas fields, including large field gathering systems 
and long mainline pipelines, was not built to supply occasional free use, 
field use, or local heating and cooking.  It was built to maximize profits, to 
secure the best prices, and to serve “distant” demand from large gas and 
electricity utilities and commercial customers who sought processed dry gas 
 
marketability services in two cases about compression costs in 1964.  Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 
388 P.2d 602, 604-06 (Kan. 1964) (describing facility installation and discussing lack of 
consultation with lessor over compressing station); Schupbach v. Cont’l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1, 5 
(Kan. 1964).  In each case, the court found that geographic terms of possible restriction in the 
lease, “at the mouth of the well” in Gilmore and an identical term in Schupbach, did not authorize 
deductions when the services that generated the costs were intended to make gas marketable.  
128.  Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 20, 768 N.W.2d 496, 502 (claiming that 
because the gas, like the gas in Hurinenko, “has no market value at the well, the only way to 
determine the market value of the gas at the well is to work back from where a market value 
exists, meaning using the work-back method . . . .”). The marketable-product conclusion, of 
course, is quite different: because there is no market at the well, “production” is not complete, the 
lessee has not finished its implied duty to produce a marketable product, and royalty should be 
paid on the value of the gas where it is marketable.   
129.  Id. ¶ 16, 768 N.W.2d at 501. 
130.  On the best-price responsibility, see MCARTHUR, supra note 1, Part VI.B.  
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in the condition that lets it enter and be shipped in large, often interstate, 
pipelines.  Thus, it is no surprise to find some courts concluding that gas 
becomes marketable only when it is in a condition and location to enter 
such large transmission pipelines, not small gathering lines.131 
The “at the well” argument also raises questions about preserving the 
value of liquids as opposed to the dry methane gas.  Over time the liquids 
entrained in natural gas have become increasingly valuable, so much so that 
today companies often seek liquids-rich gas in preference to dry gas.  The 
general liquids stream, the “Y-grade” stream, is separated from the dry 
methane gas by processing and liquids from each other by fractionation.132  
The use of “at the well” to limit recoveries to raw gas would deprive the 
lessors of their share of the liquid content of their gas.133  Yet it long has 
been the rule that even when leases are silent about minerals not known to 
be marketable at the time of signing, lessees have to pay royalties on 
additional minerals if the market evolves so that these minerals come to 
have separate economic value, unless the lease specifically excludes these 
minerals.134  Taken literally, the “at the well” approach advocated by many 
lessees would block this mutual sharing of common value. 
 
131.  See supra text accompanying notes 77-79. 
132.   The Natural Gas Supply Association provides a generic description of these processes.  
For its description of processing and of fractionation, the procedure for separating individual 
liquids, see Processing Natural Gas, supra note 127, http://naturalgas.org/naturalgas/processing-
ng/ (last visited, July 9, 2015).  
133.  For instance, a producing lessee is trying to justify a policy of only paying royalties on 
a price appropriate to raw unprocessed gas (with no separate payment for liquids), even though it 
sells its gas after processing downstream.  See generally Brief for WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 
Abraham v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (D.N.M. 2014) (No. CIV 12–0917 
JB/ACT).  The author is an expert for the class in that case.  
134.  This issue arose in Haynes v. Eagle-Picher Co., 295 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1961).  The 
plaintiffs owned a royalty interest entitling them to five percent of the market value “at the place 
mined or produced of all oil, gas, asphaltum, lead, zinc and all other minerals or substances 
whatever, which may be mined or removed . . . .”  Id. at 762.  There was “no market” for the ore 
until it was reduced to concentrates, which traditionally had been sold as lead concentrate and zinc 
concentrate.  Id.  Lessee Eagle-Picher adopted “advanced processing techniques” that let it also 
save sulphur, cadmium, and germanium out of concentrate residue and urged that “custom and 
practice which existed for many years . . . of paying royalties only on the market value of the 
concentrates” precluded its having to pay on these three minerals that it had learned to extract 
from the concentrate residue.  Id. at 765.  The court held that even though the ore may have had no 
value where mined, it did where “produced” [thus including off-site processing in “production”] 
and holding it “common knowledge that minerals are not separated from the earth in pure form 
and that, except in rare instances, some processing is necessary to render them marketable.”  Id. at 
764.  Eagle-Picher had to pay royalties on the three added minerals that its further processing 
turned into marketable products.  On the question of which minerals are covered from the gas 
stream, see also the highly influential helium decision in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 
441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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Lessees likely will argue that paying the royalty share imposes too 
many costs on them.135  In considering this argument, one fact to balance is 
that the lessee already receives the lion’s share, usually a seven-eighths 
share of revenues, but under more modern leases, sometimes five-sixths. 
Such higher shares compensate for the lessee’s added costs, including all 
drilling costs and other costs incurred to satisfy its cluster of duties, 
including the duty to market.  The unfairness argument uses rhetoric that 
sounds as if all marketability costs are being shifted to the lessee.  Yet no 
one disputes that the lessee must bear the majority of these costs; the 
dispute is only over whether it can shift a small proportion of the costs to 
the royalty interest.  The lessee’s greater revenue interest does not itself 
prove that it should bear all costs, but it is a reminder that lessors have 
given very valuable consideration in order to have the lessee produce a 
marketable product and, even before considering deductions, only get a 
small part of the resulting revenue in return. 
The difference between “at the well” jurisdictions and marketable-
product jurisdictions seems unlikely to be bridged.  Instead, the industry is 
likely to remain split into today’s two camps, with some variation within 
the marketable-product standards.  At the end of the day, the difference may 
come down to the fundamental interpretative difference that John Lowe 
suggested as an explanation for different positions on whether lessees have 
to share take-or-pay settlements and prepayments: whether one takes a 
narrow plain meaning approach to the lease, looking to the words for 
meaning—even if they are vague—but not to the lease purpose as such, or 
instead putting more emphasis on the purpose of the lease and reading the 
words in that context.136  If marketable-product issues return again to the 
North Dakota Supreme Court, these considerations should help guide its 
decision. 
 
135.  The Kansas Supreme Court faced cost arguments in a recent case in which it reversed 
the court of appeals.  Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc., 352 P.3d 1032 (Kan. 2015), rev’g 306 P.3d 
318 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).  Lessee Oil Producers, Inc. advanced a “cripple industry” argument.  
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 38-41, Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90).  It combined a 
financial harm argument and what was in effect a due process argument (called a “violat[ion of] 
fundamental principles”) in its supplemental brief.  Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellant, at 
16-17, Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90).  The Eastern Kansas Oil and Gas Association, an 
amicus, made something like a due process argument as a “policy” argument when it called an 
implied-at-law obligation to bear the deductions “an affront to freedom of contract principles.” 
Brief of Amicus Curiae E. Kan. Oil & Gas Ass’n at 13, Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90).  
DCP Midstream, appropriately enough a mid-stream company, warns that the decision below 
would “increase[] producers’ royalty obligations materially beyond those initially agreed” if the 
Kansas Supreme Court does not reverse.  Brief of Amicus Curiae DCP Midstream, LP at 15, 
Fawcett, 306 P.3d 318 (No. 11-CV-90).  
136.  See generally Lowe, supra note 120, at 244-66 (dividing cases into “plain terms” and 
“cooperative venture” jurisdictions).  
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IV. A MAJOR LIMIT ON BICE 
It is a mistake to read Bice to mean that North Dakota lessees can 
always deduct the marketability costs of natural gas.  Those who live by the 
word historically sometimes have to die by the word.  Those who insist on 
plain-meaning analysis sometimes will find they do not like the meaning 
the words generate.  If “at the well” is a binding, geographic authorization 
to deduct all costs incurred after the well, leases without such limitations or 
other express language authorizing deductions, be they proceeds or market 
value leases, should not allow any deductions. 
This issue arose in a proceeds lease in West v. Alpar Resources, Inc.,137 
a North Dakota Supreme Court decision long predating Bice.  The lease 
required payment on “one-eighth of the proceeds” of sale on gas wells 
where the gas was sold.138  The lessors refused to sign a division order 
calling for lower “net proceeds” payments and expressly authorizing a 
series of deductions.139  In that frustrating Olympian impersonality that 
appellate decisions can suffer, the opinion did not describe the full set of 
costs at issue, but the costs included the expense of extracting hydrogen 
sulfide from the sour gas as well as “other costs incurred by Alpar prior to 
the sale of the gas.”140 
Alpar Resources cited cases that it argued support an “at the well” 
approach; the Wests, cases supporting the marketable-product position.141  
The court discussed three treatises, the Williams & Meyers, Kuntz, and 
Merrill treatises, the “major treatises on oil and gas law,” which it correctly 
found “demonstrate the unsettled nature of the law in this area.”142  The 
court’s accurate summary of the state of the law in Alpar contrasts notably 
with its approach in Bice.  In Bice, the court cited articles coming from only 
one side, the “at the well” side, of this issue.143  Furthermore, the Bice court 
incorrectly treated the deduction issue as at least settling in favor of the “at 
the well” position,144 when it has not. 
Ultimately, the Alpar court found the “proceeds” lease without an “at 
the well” limitation ambiguous.145  “Rational arguments,” it believed, could 
 
137.  298 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 1980).  
138.  Id. at 486. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. at 487. 
141.  Id. at 487-88.  
142.  Id. at 489-90 (citing 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at 591-603; 3 KUNTZ, supra 
note 24, at 319-27; MERRILL, supra note 24, at 212-18). 
143.  Bice v. Petro Hunt, L.L.C., 2009 ND 124, ¶ 13, 768 N.W.2d 496, 500-01. 
144.  Id. ¶¶ 13-21, 768 N.W.2d at 500-03 (treating at the well as the majority rule). 
145.  West, 298 N.W.2d at 490. 
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be made to support the position that this meant a gross proceeds standard 
and to support the contrary view that royalty should be set at the wellhead, 
with deductions after that.146  It cited the rule that ambiguities are construed 
against the lessee, who usually is “well informed” and therefore has “many 
advantages” in drafting leases and “could have easily included express 
language to that effect in the lease.”147  Royalties, therefore, were due on 
total proceeds, not proceeds minus deductions.148  Nothing in Bice conflicts 
with this language.  Gross proceeds leases, naked proceeds leases, 
presumably naked market value leases, and other leases with no geographic 
referent should not allow deductions in North Dakota even if the court 
continues to maintain that “at the well” leases do.149 
V. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DEDUCTION RULE 
ON THE MERITS. 
Bice rests on shaky, eroded ground.  The court’s decision on the 
marketable-product standard is of great importance to this state: to its 
natural gas producers and royalty owners, to its investors as well as farmers 
and small businessmen, to those employed in the industry as well as those 
receiving income from it.  As a result, the court should revisit its holding on 
North Dakota’s gas-deduction rule when an opportunity arises.  In making 
its analysis, it should jettison the incorrect assumption that marketable-
product courts are in the minority, and it should not assume that answering 
a factual question about markets poses an unusual complexity to be 
avoided.  The court should remove any Hurinenko blinders before 
 
146.  Id.  Yet “proceeds,” like “gross proceeds,” has an industry meaning.  See Hockett v. 
Trees Oil Co., 251 P.3d 65, 71-72 (Kan. 2011) (listing the operative royalty language and 
interpreting “proceeds” as requiring royalty payment on “gross sales price”).  The term 
“proceeds,” used without more, is not ambiguous. 
147.  West, 298 N.W.2d at 491.  
148.  Id.   
149.  Lessees who endorse the “at the well” approach will argue that deductions should be 
allowed beyond the well even in gross proceeds leases, unless the lease specifically prohibits 
deductions.  In other words, rather than require the lease to authorize deductions, they assume that 
deductions are always allowed unless prohibited.  And, indeed, in the most extreme case, the 
Texas Supreme Court has allowed deductions in a “market value at the well” lease even when 
more specific language expressly prohibited deductions: the language included a specific 
prohibition that “there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor’s royalty by reason of any 
required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter to market 
such gas.”  Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 120-23 (Tex. 1996) (emphasis 
added).  The majority treated “market value at the well” as providing that all expenses incurred 
after the well are deductible, id. at 122-23, but did not provide any plausible explanation for the 
very, very specific no-deduction language.  The opinion spawned a forceful dissent.  Id. at 131 
(Gonzalez, J., joined by Abbott, J., dissenting).  A four justice minority voted to rehear the case. 
Heritage Res. Inc. v. NationsBank, 960 S.W.2d 619, 619 (Gonzalez, J., joined by Cornyn, Spector, 
and Abbott, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing), to no avail.  
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analyzing the underlying merits, and it should weigh de novo the reasoning 
of marketable-product and “at the well” jurisdictions.  The court should 
consider the duty to market with its requirement that lessees secure the best 
price possible; the fact that lessees choose to provide many services 
downstream rather than at the well for their own economic benefit; the fact 
that most gas fields would not be in production if not for downstream 
markets, whose supply is purchased as pipeline-ready gas; and the post-
deregulation shift of primary natural gas markets from at or near the 
wellhead to downstream market centers after the processing plant.  It is this 
last change that has led marketable-product jurisdictions to bar deductions 
in order to preserve what they see as the same general obligation the lessee 
always has borne: that of producing a marketable product. 
 
